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1 Introduction
Much of corporate finance assumes that investors are perfectly competitive, and the supply of
capital is perfectly elastic. While this assumption may sometimes be suitable for public equity
market, private equity markets typically face an inelastic supply of capital, and a limited number
of investors who exercise market power. The standard implication of market power is that
investors can take larger equity stakes, which drives down the valuation of the company. This
result is based on a single round investment logic, where the investor is an outsider without a
prior stake in the company. Many private equity markets, however, are characterized by staged
financing where investors fund companies over several rounds. This is common with angel
financing, venture capital, growth capital, or private placements. It also happens with publicly-
listed companies that raise money in initial public offerings (IPOs), seasoned equity offerings
(SEOs), or PIPEs (private investments in public equity). The fundamental difference with staged
financing is that while an investor is an outsider the first time he invests, he becomes an insider
thereafter. The question is whether an insider with market power would behave differently than
an outsider?
This paper poses two main research questions. First, in a staged financing context, what
is the effect of investor power on the valuation of a company? Second, when does a company
want to bring a powerful investor inside?
To answer these questions, we build a parsimonious theory of staged financing. The com-
pany needs two financing rounds. Information is symmetric, and the company faces a supply of
capital that is not perfectly elastic. Our focus is the effect of market power on the valuations of
early and late rounds. As long as investors are competitive, the valuation of the late round is in-
dependent of the valuation that is obtained in the first round. However, with a powerful investor
this is not true, because it matters what stake he obtained in the first round. If he is an outsider,
the powerful investor always wants to push down the valuation of the second round. However,
if he already has a stake in the company, there is a trade-off. On the one hand, the powerful
investor invests new money and therefore wants a lower valuation just like an outsider. We call
this the aggressive outsider logic. On the other hand, he already has a stake in the company,
and prefers a higher valuation just like an insider. We call this the defensive insider logic. The
net preference depends on the relative sizes of the existing stake versus the new investments.
Our theory derives a simple condition that says that a powerful investor prefers a higher (lower)
valuation whenever his second-round investment is below (above) the pro-rata threshold. In the
next section we provide a simple numerical example to illustrate the logic of this result. The
important novelty is that with staged financing, market power has an ambiguous effect on valu-
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ations. In particular, the model identifies a large range of parameters where market power leads
to higher, not lower valuations in the second-round.
Turning to the first round, we ask about the effect of market power on valuations, and
whether the company wants to bring the powerful investor into the first round. We distinguish
three scenarios. The benchmark scenario is perfect competition without any powerful investor.
We then look at a scenario where the company obtains first-round funding from the powerful
investor, and finally the scenario where the company delays bringing in the powerful investor
until the second round. We find that first-round valuations are highest with competition, lower
when postponing the investment of the powerful investor, and lowest when the powerful insider
participates in the first round. At first glance this result seems to suggest that bringing in the
powerful insider up-front is a bad idea, because it generates the lowest first-round valuation.
However, as noted above, having an insider increases second-round valuations. The question
becomes whether the higher second-round valuations can justify the lower first-round valua-
tion? We formally show that the company always prefers to bring a powerful investor inside at
the first round. The key intuition is that even though the company doesn’t like investor power,
if it exists, it is better to befriend it up-front. Once the powerful investor is inside, his market
power gets used towards the benefit of the company: “May the force be with you.”
The model also generates some predictions about the returns to different equity investors.
Looking at the final returns of first-round investors, we note that powerful inside investors make
the highest returns. However, powerful insiders have lower returns in the second round. In-
deed, moderately powerful insiders who invest below pro-rata have even lower returns than the
benchmark return of competitive investors. Powerful outsiders, by contrast, have the highest
returns of all second-round investors. The analysis also shows that unrealized interim returns
need to be interpreted with caution. For example, competitive investors experience low interim
returns when the company is financed by a powerful outsider in the second round. However,
these are not realized returns. In fact, these competitive investors achieve higher returns be-
tween the second round and the date where value is realized, fully recouping their benchmark
returns. This last finding is a useful warning for empirical work that uses unrealized interim
returns as a measure of performance. Our analysis suggests that market power invalidates the
interpretation of unrealized returns as a proxy for expected realized returns.
Our paper builds on several prior literatures. Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) were the first
to examine equity valuations in a staged financing context. Their model focuses on identifying
robust financial contracts, and shows how an inside investor is neutral with respect to valuations
when investing at pro-rata. Their model does not foresee inside investors investing below or
above pro-rata, and market power is not directly accounted for. The issue of market power
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does arise in models of hold-up, such as in the work of Grossman and Hart (1986), and Aghion
and Tirole (1994). These models are based on incomplete contracting – no such assumption is
used in our model. In this line of research, Khanna and Mathews (2015) is probably closest
to our paper. They use a staged financing model where the inside investor reduces hold-up
power by using high prices that also provide a signal to third parties. In our model inside
investors sometimes bring about higher but other times lower prices, depending on how the new
investment compares against the existing ownership stake.1
In addition to the literature on staged equity financing, there is a closely related literature
about staged debt financing. The seminal work by Rajan (1992) identifies advantages and disad-
vantages of inside lenders who have better information on the company at the time of refinanc-
ing, but can also use that informational advantage to extract some information rents. Berglöf
and Von Thadden (1994) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) further extend this type of analysis
to allow for optimal securities and multiple investors. In our model we assume symmetric infor-
mation, and therefore abstract away from informational advantages of insiders. Instead we look
at sized-based market power. This approach is related to Burkhart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997)
who emphasize the importance of size for monitoring incentives. As an extension to our base
model, we also consider the use of debt. We find a rationale for powerful insiders to use equity
over debt. With equity they internalize valuation effects at the time of the second round, and
therefore use their market power in a way that is more beneficial to the company. With debt,
however, there is no need to protect prior stakes, and so market power is not used to defend the
valuation.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section we provide a simple numerical
example to illustrate how a powerful investor would like to change the company valuation. In
Section 3 we provide our staged financing model with a powerful investor. Section 4 considers
model extensions and empirical predictions. It is followed by a brief conclusion. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
2 A Simple Numerical Example
To illustrate a central insight, we briefly consider a simple numerical example. Suppose a com-
pany needs to raise $10M in a second-round financing. There is a powerful investor who already
owns 20% of the company from the first round. Suppose that there are only two valuations under
1Further theories about staged financing include the work of Neher (1999), Cornelli and Yosha (2003), Berge-
mann and Hege (2005), Hellmann and Thiele (2015), and Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2017).
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consideration. Either the second-round investors receive 50% of the company for their $10M
investment, which implies a post-money valuation of $20M (= $10/50%). Or the second-round
investors receive 40% of the company for their $10M investment, which implies a valuation of
$25M (= $10/40%). What deal would the powerful investor prefer?
Suppose first that the powerful investor plans to invest $2M in the new round. In this case
he provides 20% of the new money and receives 20% from the stake of the new investors.
However, if he already owns 20% of the existing stake, and now receives 20% of the new stake,
his overall stake simply remains at 20%. This is called investing at pro-rata, i.e., investing in the
new round an amount that is proportional to the existing stake. It allows the existing investor to
exactly maintain his ownership stake.
An insight going back to Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) is that if an investor invests at pro-
rata, then he is indifferent between lower and higher valuations, precisely because he always
maintains the same ownership stake. While Admati and Pfleiderer fix the investment of the
insider at pro-rata, we consider what would happen if the insider invested above or below pro-
rata. Suppose the powerful investor invested $3M out of the $10M in the second round. Under
the low valuation he would get a stake of 30%*50% = 15%, and his existing stake would be
worth 20%*50%=10%, so his overall stake would be 25%. Under the high valuation he would
get a stake of 30%*40% = 12%, and his existing stake would be worth 20%*60%=12%, so his
overall stake would be 24%. This shows that a powerful investor who invests above pro-rata
prefers the low valuation. The outsider logic of investing at a low valuation dominates because
the new outsider stake is relatively larger than the existing insider stake.
Consider next the case where the powerful investor invests below pro-rata. Suppose he only
provides $1M out of the $10M in the second round. Under the low valuation he would get a
stake of 10%*50% = 5%, and his existing stake would be worth 20%*50%=10%, so his overall
stake would be 15%. Under the high valuation he would get a stake of 10%*40% = 4%, and his
existing stake would be worth 20%*60%=12%, so his overall stake would be 16%. This shows
that when the powerful investor invests below pro-rata, he prefers the high valuation. In this
case the investment made in the second round is relatively small (below pro-rata) compared the
existing stake. Consequently, the insider logic of preferring high valuations dominates.
This example illustrates the way that a powerful insider would like to influence the valuation
of the company. Naturally, this simple example is built on several artificial assumptions. It also
does not explain how the investor can influence the valuation, and what the equilibrium looks
like. For all this we need a proper theory model. We turn to that in the next section.
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3 Main Model
3.1 Base Assumptions
Consider a company, called A, which requires two rounds of financing for a project.2 Specif-
ically, A needs to raise an amount K1 in the first round, and K2 in the second round, with
K1 < K2. The project generates an expected return x > 0. For parsimony we assume no
discounting. There are three dates, date 1 for the first round, date 2 for the second round, and
date 3 for the realization of returns.
There are n risk neutral competitive investors, which we denote by C. In Section 3.2.2
we will introduce a powerful investor. A uses a competitive auction in each round to raise the
required capital. Competitive investors play a simultaneous move game where they all submit
their supply schedules at the same time. The prices (α, β, to be introduced shortly) clear the
market in a standard Walrasian fashion.
We assume that the first round is small, so that only one investor provides K1.3 For each
investor the cost of providing K1 is given by C1(K1) = µ1K1, with µ1 > 1.4 In return the
investor gets an equity share, denoted by α. Similarly, the second-round investors invest K2,
and jointly receive a total equity share β. The post-money valuations are given by V1 = K1/α
and V2 = K2/β. We assume that K2 is large, requiring the company to raise funding from
multiple investors; this is also known as a syndicated investment round. A competitive investor
provides an amount kj2, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, incurring a cost cj2 = µ2kj2+ γ2
(
kj2
)2
. For γ > 0 costs are
convex, so that the supply of capital is not infinitely elastic. The increasing marginal costs of
investing should be interpreted as increasing opportunity costs for investors who are allocating
more capital into A (as opposed to all other investment opportunities). The more the investor
allocates his portfolio to this deal, the more exposed (or less diversified) his portfolio becomes.
Note that our model uses competitive but not atomistic investors. This means that the market has
a finite number of investors, each facing increasing marginal investment costs. This approach
2For simplicity we directly assume that financing comes in two stages. It is easy to extend the model to
endogenously derive optimal staging. All that is required is to add some uncertainty, and the possibility that in
case of failure the entrepreneur spends all remaining funds on private benefits.
3For simplicity we assume that the first round competitive investor does not participate in the second round.
Relaxing this would increase the complexity of the exposition, but would not impact the results. This is because
individual competitive investors are too small to affect market prices.
4To keep the model as simple as possible we assume that all investors have the same costs. However, allowing
for heterogenous costs would not change the main insights from the model. Moreover, for simplicity we assume
that costs in the first period are small and linear. We can think of this as the first term of a Taylor series expansion.
Allowing for larger and non-linear costs would increase the complexity of the model.
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will allow us to introduce market power in a simple and intuitive way, as discussed in Section
3.2.2.
3.2 second-round Investments and Valuations
We start by deriving the equilibrium investments and company valuation in the second round.
To illustrate the effect of market power in our staged financing model, we first consider the
competitive benchmark where no investor can influence the price (β). We then show how market
power affects investments and valuation.
3.2.1 Competitive Benchmark
Suppose there are n competitive investors in the second round. We assume that the second-
round price, as represented by β, clears the market in a Walrasian fashion. We call this the NP
case, which stands for “No Powerful” investor.
When investing kj2, j = 1, ..., n, in the second round, investor j gets the equity share
kj2
K2
β.
The objective function for each competitive investor is therefore given by
max
kj2
kj2
K2
βx− µ2kj2 −
γ
2
(
kj2
)2
.
Consequently, each competitive investor invests the amount kj2(β) so that the price per unit of
capital equals the marginal cost:
1
K2
βx = µ2 + γk
j
2. (1)
Moreover, the equilibrium equity share for all second-round investors, β, is defined by the
market clearing condition nkj2(β) = K2.
Solving the system of two equations we find that the investment by a competitive investor j
is kj|NP2 = K2/n. Moreover, the equilibrium equity share β
NP is given by
βNP =
K2
x
[
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
]
. (2)
This implies the following company valuation:
V NP2 =
K2
βNP
=
x
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
. (3)
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For later comparison, we note that the first-round price α does not affect the second-round
valuation V NP2 . This is because second-round investors take the first-round price α as given.
We will see that this is not true for the powerful investor.
It easy to see some additional comparative statics results from the expression of V NP2 . A
higher cost of capital forces A to issue more equity, which implies a lower second-round valu-
ation (i.e., dV NP2 /dµ2, dV
NP
2 /dγ < 0). By contrast, a higher expected return implies a lower
price β, and therefore a higher valuation (i.e., dV NP2 /dx > 0). Likewise, if A requires a
larger amount in the second round (K2), then each investor needs to provide more capital (i.e.,
dk
j|NP
2 /dK2 > 0). Naturally the round can then only close if A issues more equity, which im-
plies a lower valuation (i.e., dV NP2 /dK2 < 0). We find the opposite with respect to the number
of investors n: The presence of more investors induces every single investor to invest less (so
that dkj|NP2 /dn < 0). This implies a lower total cost of financing across all investors (due to
the convexity of cj2). The company can then raise the amount K2 with less equity, which in turn
improves the company valuation (dV NP2 /dn > 0).
3.2.2 Powerful Investor
We now introduce a powerful investor, called P . For this it is convenient to assume that out of
the n investors, m investors coordinate their investments, and therefore act as a single powerful
investor (P ). Thus, m will be our measure of market power.5
Let us explain the rationale behind this way of modelling market power. In order to compare
market constellations with more or less market power, we want to maintain an overall cost
structure in the market. That is, we want to vary market power while holding constant the
overall elasticity of capital supply. It would be tempting to simply add to the n competitive
investors one powerful investor P , and give him his own convex cost function. However, this
would increase are the overall funds available, and thus alter the market cost structure. The
approach chosen here allows us to preserve the overall cost structure. Specifically, we retain
n “pockets” of financing, each with its convex cost cj2 = µ2k
j
2 +
γ
2
(
kj2
)2
. Market power in
our model is the ability to coordinate the action of a subset m of these pockets of capital. One
way of thinking about this is that m investors in the market manage to collude and act as a
single decision maker. This kind of coordination can be interpreted as a financial intermediary
who invests as a single actor on behalf of the m “pockets” of capital. This would be a stylized
description of venture capital, where the venture capital firm (aka the general partner) acts on
5For simplicity we assume that n is sufficiently large so that the (n−m) competitive investors continue to have
no market power, and thus continue to be price-takers.
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behalf of the ultimate investors (aka limited partners). It can also be thought of as an investment
syndicate (such as an angel group or a closely-knit group of venture capitalists), where one
leader acts on behalf of the group to negotiate the deal.
We assume that the powerful investor makes investments, but cannot make any transfer
payments. Due to our sparse set of assumptions, there is a theoretical possibility in this model
that a powerful investor makes a transfer payment to the company, and then owns and runs the
entire company. This is clearly unrealistic, and it is easy to augment the model to exclude this
possibility.6
The model with a powerful investor distinguishes two cases. First, there is the case of a
powerful inside investor, who participated in the first financing round, and therefore already
holds a stake in the company. We denote this stake by αP . We call this the PI case, which
stands for “Powerful Insider”. Second, there is the case of the powerful outside investor. He
only arrives at the second round, and is assumed to be unavailable at the time of the first round.
In this case a competitive outcome occurs at the first stage investment K1. At the second stage
we can simply set αP = 0. We call this the PO case, which stands for “Powerful Outsider”.
We can think of two possible reasons why P is not around in the first round. One is that some
investors do not like to invest in early stage deals, or find it too costly to do so (i.e., µP1 is very
large). Another reason is that A does not yet want to approach P , i.e., the company wants to
avoid facing the powerful investor. In the former case, P ’s absence is exogenous, in the latter
case it is endogenous. In Section 3.3.3 we analyze the latter case.
3.2.3 The Case of a Powerful Insider
Consider first the case of a powerful insider. P provides the amount KP2 = mk
i
2, i = 1, ...,m,
in the second round, while each of the competitive investors C invest kj2, j = m + 1, ..., n. It
6The assumption of no transfer payments is standard in the literature (see Rajan (1992), or Hellmann (2002)
for a discussion). One way to derive this constraint endogenously is to add a simple adverse selection problem.
Suppose that in addition to the honest companies described so far, there are dishonest companies that can pretend
to have a business that looks identical to the honest ones. The dishonest companies take the transfer payment and
disappears, leaving investors with a total loss. If for every honest company there are enough dishonest ones, no
investor would ever make a transfer payment, simply because the probability of investing in a dishonest company
is too high. Other ways of justifying the absence of transfer payments are based on moral hazard models, where
the owner/manager needs to retain as much equity as possible to continue providing effort for the success of the
company.
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is convenient to define each “pocket” of capital controlled by P as ki2 = K
P
2 /m, i = 1, ...,m.
This way we derive the total investment cost for the powerful investor P as
CP = m
[
µ2k
i
2 +
γ
2
(
ki2
)2]
= µ2K
P
2 +
γ
2m
(
KP2
)2
. (4)
When choosing his investment KP2 , P takes the effect on the equilibrium price β into ac-
count. This price is defined by the market clearing condition
KP2 + (n−m) kj2(β) = K2, j = m+ 1, ..., n, (5)
where kj2(β) =
1
γ
[
1
K2
βx− µ2
]
is the amount provided by each competitive investor (which can
be derived from (1) in Section 3.2.1).
P chooses KP2 to maximize his expected net return
pi
P |PI
2 (K
P
2 ) = (1− β(KP2 ))αPx+
KP2
K2
β(KP2 )x−
[
µ2K
P
2 +
γ
2m
(
KP2
)2]
, (6)
where β(KP2 ) is the total equity issued to the second-round investors as a function of P ’s invest-
ment (as defined by the market clearing condition (5)), and KP2 /K2 is P ’s share in the round.
Intuitively P ’s expected net payoff depends on three components. The second term represent his
second-round equity stake (K
P
2
K2
β(KP2 )). The third term represents his cost of capital (C
P (KP2 )).
So far this is similar to competitive investors. The most interesting component is the first term.
P holds an equity stake αP from his first-round investment K1. This gets diluted as A needs to
issue equity to new investors (including to P ). This component therefore captures the fact that
P is an inside investor who also cares about preserving his existing stake.
We informally note that the first component is decreasing in β. This means that as an
insider P prefers a higher valuation (i.e., lower β). We call this the “defensive” insider logic.
The second component, however, is increasing in β. As an outsider P prefers a lower valuation
(i.e., higher β). We call this the “aggressive” outsider logic. The relative strength of these two
logics will play a key role in determining how P exercises his market power. We discuss this in
Section 3.3.
In the Appendix we show that in equilibrium P invests
K
P |PI
2 =
m
n+m
[
1 + αP
]
K2. (7)
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Figure 1: Second Round Investments
We can immediately see that P ’s investment KP |PI2 depends on his first-round equity stake α
P .
This also applies to the second-round valuation V PI2 , given by
V PI2 =
K2
βPI
=
x
µ2 + γ
n− αPm
n2 −m2 K2
. (8)
Note that for m = 0, this simplifies back to the competitive valuation V NP2 (see (3) in
Section 3.2.1).
An important question is how P ’s investment KP |PI2 relates to the pro-rata investment. In
other words, when does P invest below pro-rata and accept a dilution of his stake, and when
does P invest above pro-rata to increase his stake? The next lemma provides a simple condition.
Lemma 1 P invests above (below) pro-rata whenever m > (<) m̂ ≡ αPn .
Lemma 1 says that P invests above (below) pro-rata whenever his power (m), is above
(below) a critical value m̂. This critical value varies with his prior equity stake (αP ). With this
we can examine how P ’s market power (as measured by m), and his first-round equity stake
αP , affect KP |PI2 and V
PI
2 .
Proposition 1 Consider the PI case. The investment by P , KP |PI2 , is increasing in both m
and αP . Moreover, there exists a threshold m′, with 0 < m′ < m̂, such that the second-round
valuation of A, V PI2 , is increasing in m for m < m
′, and decreasing thereafter. The valuation
V PI2 is also increasing in α
P .
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Figure 2: Second Round Valuations
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the main insights from Proposition 1 (these two figures also com-
pare the PI case with the other cases, which we discuss in more detail in Section 3.2.5). More
market power (m) encourages P to provide a larger share of the required second-round invest-
ment K2. The effect on valuation is non-monotonic. To get an intuition, we first note that P
behaves just like a competitive investor in two cases: when m is small, i.e. when there is not
much concentration of power, and when m = m̂, i.e., when P maintains exactly his pro-rata.
Between these critical values, we find that the valuation first rises and then falls in m. The
intuition for the valuation rising initially in m is that P is driven by the defensive insider logic
that comes from the first component of equation (6). The intuition why it falls again is that as
P invests larger amounts, he is increasingly driven by the aggressive outsider logic from the
second component of (6). For m = m̂, the insider and outsider logic exactly cancel out. For
m > m̂, the aggressive outsider logic always dominates. Note also that the intuition for why
the valuation is always increasing in αP is that a higher αP increases the first component, and
therefore strengthens the defensive insider logic.
3.2.4 The Case of a Powerful Outsider
So far we assumed that the powerful investor is an insider, with some ownership stake αP > 0.
We now turn to the case of a powerful outside investor. Technically this is a special case of the
model from the previous section with a powerful insider where we set αP = 0 in (7) and (8).
Proposition 2 Consider the PO case. The investment by P , KP |PO2 , is increasing m. The
second-round valuation, V PO2 , is always decreasing in m.
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In the PO case, P does not hold any equity when participating in the second financing round
(αP = 0). This means that P can only invest above pro-rata (since m > αPn = 0). P is not
concerned about equity dilution, and only uses his market power to drive the valuation down
(see also Figures 1 and 2).
In the Appendix we derive some additional comparative statics results with respect to equi-
librium investments and valuations for the PI and PO cases. The cost of capital (µ2, γ), as
well as the expected return (x), do not affect P ’s investment (KP |PI2 , K
P |PO
2 ). However, the
cost of capital has a negative effect on valuation (V PI2 , V
PO
2 ), while the expected return has a
positive effect on valuation. Furthermore, a higher capital requirement in the second round (K2)
results in P making a larger investment (KP |PI2 , K
P |PO
2 ), leading to a lower company valuation
(V PI2 , V
PO
2 ). The presence of more investors (n) also implies a lower equilibrium investment
by P , and a higher company valuation. Finally, we show in the Appendix that P ’s participation
constraint is always satisfied.7
3.2.5 Comparing Second-round Constellations
We now compare the second-round investments and company valuations when P is an insider
versus outsider. We also compare both cases against the competitive benchmark (NP case). For
this it is useful to define KP |NP2 ≡ mki2 = mnK2. This is the total amount that P would provide
in a (counterfactual) competitive benchmark.8 All results derived in this section are illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2.
We begin with a Proposition focussed on the powerful outsider (PO) case.
Proposition 3 For all m, and all αP > 0, a powerful outsider makes the smallest second-
round investment, i.e., KP |PO2 < {KP |PI2 , KP |NP2 }. This also results in the lowest second-round
company valuation, i.e., V PO2 < {V PI2 , V NP2 }.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the investment and valuation in the PO case compare to the
other scenarios. In the PO case, P does not have a stake in A (αP = 0). It is then optimal for P
to exploit his market power to drive down the valuation of the company. This can be achieved
by investing a smaller amount compared to the competitive benchmark (i.e., KP |PO2 < K
P |NP
2 ,
so that V PO2 < V
NP
2 ). This result is consistent with the standard economics result that market
7Note that this also implies that a constellation where P participates in the first round, but not the second round,
can never arise in equilibrium.
8Note that the investment amount of an individual investment “pocket”, kj|NP2 , does not depend on m. How-
ever, the more individual pockets belong to P , the higher the total investment KP |NP2 .
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power leads to smaller quantities (here: smaller investment) and higher prices (here: lower
valuation, which means higher cost of capital for the company).
To further understand why the powerful insider behaves differently from the powerful out-
sider, we note that having a stake in the company (PI case with αP > 0) curbs P ’s temptation
to drive valuations down in the second round. That is, when choosing his second-round invest-
ment KP2 , P trades off the positive effect on his second-round equity stake (
KP2
K2
β(KP2 )), and
the negative effect on his first-round stake (αP ). A larger stake from the first financing round
(αP ) makes it optimal for P to invest a larger amount in the second round, resulting in a higher
valuation (see Proposition 1).
Proposition 3 shows that having a powerful outsider leads to the lowest possible second-
round valuation. We also just discussed how the powerful insider increases second-round valu-
ations, relative to the powerful outsider. It remains to be seen how the powerful insider compares
to the competitive benchmark (the NP case).
Proposition 4 Comparing the powerful insider against the competitive benchmark, we distin-
guish two cases:
(i) Moderately powerful insider: Supposem ≤ m̂. P invests more in the second round com-
pared to the competitive benchmark (i.e., KP |PI2 ≥ KP |NP2 ). The second-round valuation
is higher compared to the competitive benchmark (i.e., V PI2 ≥ V NP2 ).
(ii) Highly powerful insider: Suppose m > m̂. P invests less in the second round compared
to the competitive benchmark (i.e., KP |PI2 < K
P |NP
2 ). The second-round valuation is
lower compared to the competitive benchmark (i.e., V PI2 < V
NP
2 ).
The insights from Proposition 4 can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. At the critical level of
market power (m = m̂), we know that P invests exactly at pro-rata, and therefore maintains his
stake in the company. In this case the outcome is identical to the competitive benchmark, i.e.,
P provides the same amount of capital in the second round (KP |PI2 = K
P |NP
2 ), leading to the
same company valuation (V PI2 = V
NP
2 ).
If the inside investor is highly powerful (m > m̂), he invests more in absolute terms, but
strategically reduces his investment compared to the competitive benchmark (KP |PI2 < K
P |NP
2 ),
as shown in Figure 1. In doing so P accepts a dilution of his first-round equity stake, but obtains
a lower company valuation in the second round (V PI2 < V
NP
2 ), as shown in Figure 2. This
captures the problem of having an insider that is too powerful. At the same time we note that
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it is better for A to have the powerful investor as an insider, than as an outsider. This follows
from the fact that valuations are even lower with the powerful outsider.
Maybe the most interesting insight pertains to the investments of a moderately powerful in-
sider (m < m̂). Such an inside investor strategically invests above pro-rata (KP |PI2 > K
P |NP
2 );
see Figure 1. This increases the second-round valuation, and helps to preserve P ’s stake from
the first-round investment, as shown in Figure 2. The moderately powerful insider is therefore
beneficial for the company, in the sense that his market power is now used to the benefit of the
company: “May the force be with you!”
3.3 First-round Investments and Valuations
We now close our staged financing model by deriving the equilibrium investments and company
valuation in the first financing round. Again, we distinguish three scenarios: (i) only competi-
tive investors participate in the first and second round (the NP case), (ii) the powerful investor
only invests in the second round (the PO case), and (iii) the powerful investor participates in
both financing rounds (the PI case). We ask how the first-round valuations differ across these
three scenarios. In addition, we derive whether in equilibrium the powerful investor enters in
the first or second round.
3.3.1 Investment by Competitive Investor
Suppose the required amount K1 in the first round is provided by a competitive investor. For
parsimony we derive the outcome for the NP and PO case jointly (they are very similar, the
only difference being βNP versus βPO).
Suppose several identical investors submit their bids to finance the first round. The winning
bid, which we denote by αi (i ∈ {NP,PO}) is then defined by the zero-profit condition for a
competitive investor:
(
1− βi)αix− µ1K1 = 0 ⇔ αi = µ1K1
(1− βi)x. (9)
While the competitive investor gets a stake αi, he knows that this stake will get diluted in the
second round when A issues βi to new investors. The equilibrium first-round price αi is then
such that the investor’s diluted share of the expected payoff equals his cost of investing K1.
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Using the expressions for βNP and βPO, we get the following first-round equilibrium valu-
ations:
V NP1 =
K1
αNP
=
1
µ1
(
1− K2
x
[
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
])
x
V PO1 =
K1
αPO
=
1
µ1
(
1− K2
x
[
µ2 +
γn
n2 −m2K2
])
x.
The next proposition summarizes how P ’s market power (m) as an outsider affects the
company valuation when the first-round investment is provided by a competitive investor.
Proposition 5 Suppose a competitive investor provides the amount K1 in the first round. If a
powerful outsider provides capital in the second round, then the valuation V PO1 is decreasing
in m.
This result is very intuitive, and can be seen from the expression of V PO1 . As noted above,
the difference between the company valuations is rooted in the amount of equity issued to the
second-round investors (βNP versus βPO). The presence of a more powerful outsider P implies
that in equilibrium more equity is being issued to the second-round investors (i.e., dβPO/dm >
0). This implies that the equity stake of the competitive first-round investor gets more diluted.
Thus the company needs to provide a higher αPO to the competitive investors, to compensate
for their subsequent dilution. This means that the first-round valuation V PO1 is lower.
From the expressions of V NP1 and V
PO
1 it is easy to derive that the first and second-round
costs of capital (µ1, µ2, γ) have a negative effect on the first-round valuation, while the effect of
the expected return (x) is positive. The required amount in the second round (K2) has a negative
effect on the first-round valuation. The presence of more second-round investors (n) implies a
higher first-round valuation. This is because it requires issuing less equity to second-round
investors, and therefore curbs the dilution of the first-round investor’s equity stake.9
3.3.2 Investment by Powerful Investor
Now suppose that P wants to finance the first round. We know from Section 3.2.2 that P always
wants to participate in the second round. Consequently, P makes the first-round investment K1
9Not surprising we find equivalent effects on company A’s expected profit, which we denote by piA|i, i ∈
{NP,OP}. The only exception concerns K1, which has a negative effect on piA|i. We provide more details in the
Appendix (see Proof of Proposition 8).
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(PI case) as long as it leads to a higher expected profit compared to waiting for the second round
(PO). Formally, P ’s participation constraint for the first round is given by piP |PI(αP ) ≥ piP |PO.
In the Appendix we show that this can always be satisfied.
The next proposition characterizes P ’s bid in the first round.
Proposition 6 P ’s bid in the first round is given by αP = α̂− , with → 0, where α̂ satisfies
α̂
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ (n+ (1− α̂)m)
n2 −m2 K2
])
= µ1K1. (10)
The resulting first-round valuation V PI1 = K1/α
P is decreasing in m.
When submitting a bid to A for the first financing round, P is competing with all the other
competitive investors. The equity stake α̂, defined in Proposition 6, makes A just indifferent
between accepting the bid α̂ and taking the bid αP from a competitive investor. The optimal
bidding strategy for P is to offer the investment K1 in exchange for a slightly lower equity
stake, so that αP = α̂− , with → 0.
Proposition 6 also shows that a more powerful investor asks for a higher equity stake αP ,
which leads to a lower company valuation in the first round (i.e., dV PI1 /dm < 0). We know
that the powerful outsider fully exploits his market power in the second period to maximize
his economic rents. In addition, we know from Propositions 2 and 3 that more market power
implies a lower second-round valuation (see also Figure 2). It follows that the powerful outsider
is very unattractive for A. This situation improves for A when P becomes an insider. Knowing
this, P can ask for a higher equity stake αP in the first round. This implies a lower valuation
V PI1 .
In the Appendix we derive additional comparative statics results. Specifically, we show that
the first-round valuation V PI1 is decreasing in the costs of capital (µ1, µ2, γ), and increasing in
the expected return (x) and the number of second-round investors (n). Moreover, we find that
the required financing amount in the first round (K1) has a positive effect on V PI1 , while the
effect of the required amount in the second round (K2) is negative.10
3.3.3 Comparing first-round Constellations
We can now compare the first-round valuations for the different investor constellations.
10The effects on companyA’s expected profit, piA|PI , are equivalent; see Proof of Proposition 8 in the Appendix
for more details.
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Proposition 7 The first-round valuation is lowest with a powerful insider (PI case), higher
with a powerful outsider (PO case), and highest when there is no powerful investor (NP case).
Formally, V PI1 < V
PO
1 < V
NP
1 for all m > 0.
The company valuation in the first round is lowest in the PI case. To see why, we first note
that P ’s offer in the first period makesAmarginally better off, compared to having a competitive
investor in the first round and P only participating in the second round (PO case). According
to Proposition 3, the second-round valuation is the lowest for the PO constellation. P then
exploits the lower outside option for A, by asking for a higher equity stake, which implies a
lower first-round valuation. This also explains why the equilibrium valuation V PI1 in the first
financing round is below the competitive benchmark.
A key insight so far is that the presence of a powerful investor can have opposite effects on
company valuations across different financing rounds. For example, with a powerful insider (PI
case) the first-round valuation is always below the competitive benchmark, while the second-
round valuation may be above the benchmark level (see Proposition 4). It therefore remains to
compare A’s expected profits under the different investor constellations.
Proposition 8 A’s expected profits for the different investor constellations are as follows: piA|NP >
piA|PI > piA|PO for all m > 0. Furthermore, A’s expected profit in the PO case (piA|PO) and
the PI case (piA|PI) is decreasing in m.
It is intuitive that the presence of a powerful investor always leads to reduced profits for
the company. The important insight pertains to the question whether a company should bring
in a powerful investor early, thereby making him an insider in later financing rounds. Having
an early stake encourages P to use his market power to defend the company valuation in later
rounds. However, bringing in P in at the beginning comes at the price of a lower valuation.
While A gets a higher valuation in the second round, it pays for it up-front. Still, Proposition 8
shows that “having the force with you” leads to a higher expected profit for the company.
4 Extensions and Discussions
4.1 Investor Returns
So far, our analysis looks at equilibrium valuations at date 1 and date 2. The model therefore
provides some insights into the structure of investor returns. In particular, we distinguish three
17
types of returns. DefineR13 (R23) as the return that a date 1 (date 2) investment generates at date
3 when the company realizes its value. Moreover, define R12 as the unrealized interim return
(at date 2) for a date 1 investment. In the model these three returns are defined as follows:
R12 =
V2 −K2
V1
R23 =
x
V2
R13 =
(1− β)x
V1
=
x
V1
V2 −K2
V2
.
These returns differ across the various model permutations. We distinguish four scenarios.
First we look at the benchmark case where there is no powerful investor (NP case). Second, we
look at the case with a powerful outsider (PO case). Third, we consider a moderately powerful
insider where m < m̂. We call this the MPI case. Finally, there is the highly powerful insider
with m > m̂, which we call the HPI case.
We immediately state the main result.
Proposition 9 The returns compare as follows:
• R13: RHPI13 > R
MPI
13 > R
NP
13 = R
PO
13 = µ1
• R23: RPO23 > R
HPI
23 > R
NP
23 > R
MPI
23
• R12: RMPI12 > R
NP
12 > R
PO
12 and R
HPI
12 > R
PO
12 .
Proposition 9 contains several intuitive results. The realized returns of date 1 investors (R13)
can be ranked according to the amount of market power exercised. Returns are highest for
highly powerful insiders, followed by moderately powerful insiders, followed by competitive
investors in the PO and NP case. Note that RPO13 = R
NP
13 = µ1 because these are the returns
of the competitive first-round investors, not the powerful investor.
The realized returns of date 2 investors (R23) are also influenced by market power, but
rank entirely differently. In particular we find that returns are highest in the PO case. This is
because a powerful investor depresses the valuation to generate the highest possible returns to
himself. The powerful insider moderates the use of his market power, because of his prior stake
in the company, as discussed in Proposition 4. In fact, the realized returns of date 2 investors
are lowest in the MPI case, which is when the moderately powerful investor boosts valuation
above the competitive benchmark.
The unrealized returns of date 1 investors at date 2 (RPO12 ) follow yet another pattern. They
rank lowest in the PO case. This is not because date 1 investors made bad investments, but
because the powerful outside investor depresses the valuation. The final realized returns of
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these date 1 investors (RPO13 ) are in fact the same as the returns in the benchmark NP case (i.e.,
RPO13 = µ1). This generates an important insight about the dangers of looking at unrealized
interim returns: In the presence of market power, unrealized interim returns can be a misleading
indicator of expected realized returns.11
4.2 The Role of Debt
So far our model considers equity investors. In this section we ask whether our results change in
the presence of debt. The main question is whether it would be more efficient for the powerful
investor to hold debt instead of equity? To examine this, suppose A wants to raise capital by
issuing debt claims to investors. The (endogenous) interest rates are denoted by r1 and r2. The
expected return from the project is uncertain, and given by x = ρxH+(1−ρ)xL, with xH > xL.
For brevity’s sake we focus on the case where debt is safe, i.e., xL ≥ (1+r1)K1+(1+r2)K2.12
Consider the second financing round, and assume for a moment that A issued equity to P in
the first round – this allows us to focus exclusively on the effect of debt financing in the second
round. In the Appendix we formally derive the equilibrium investments in the second round
under debt financing, and derive the equilibrium cost of capital r∗2. We find that the costs of
debt and equity financing in the second round are identical, i.e., (1 + r∗2)K2 = β
PIx. This is
essentially the Modigliani-Miller theorem. In the second round it is irrelevant whether A raises
the required amount K2 through debt or equity, because the financial structure doesn’t affect
any behaviors.
Now consider the first financing round, and suppose that A issues a debt claim to raise the
amount K1. In the Appendix we establish the following two results. First, when K1 is raised
from a competitive investor (PO case), then debt and equity financing are again equivalent.
Second, when the powerful investor providesK1 (PI case), then equity is optimal. The intuition
is that issuing equity in the first round makes the powerful investor defend the valuation in the
second round, to limit the dilution of his first-round equity stake. This strategic effect is not
present when P holds debt, because in this case the value of his existing stake is not affected
by the valuation in the second round. Our model therefore identifies a new reason for the
use of equity, which is similar but not identical to the traditional incentive argument. The
11For completeness, note also that date 1 investors in the MPI case achieve both higher unrealized interim
returns (RMPI12 ) and higher realized final returns (R
MPI
13 ), compared to the benchmark returns (R
NP
12 and R
NP
13 ),
and also compared to the PO case (RPO12 and R
PO
13 ). Finally, comparisons for the HPI case cannot always be
signed unambiguously.
12In this simple model with only two states, any risky debt is equivalent to equity. Hence the combination of
safe debt and equity covers all relevant combinations.
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traditional argument is that investors need equity to have incentives for providing more value-
adding services. This is typically modelled as a two-sided moral hazard problem (see, e.g.,
Da Rin et al. 2012, and Serfes, Hong, and Thiele (2018)). The reason for using equity in our
model is also related to incentives, but not to moral hazard. Instead the argument is that by
giving equity to the powerful investor, he takes the value of insiders into consideration when
exercising his market power. This argument is reminiscent of Da Rin and Hellmann (2002) who
look at how market power allows a bank to finance “big push” investments.
4.3 Empirical Predictions
Our theory generates several testable empirical predictions. The most important empirical pre-
dictions concern the relationship between valuations and investor power. When investing in a
company for the first time, powerful investors drive valuations downs. However, in follow-up
investments, they only drive valuations down if they invest above pro-rata. If they invest below
pro-rata, they drive valuations up. This effect is non-monotonic. It is smaller when insider
investments are either sufficiently small, or else sufficiently close to the pro-rata benchmark.
The model also generates empirical predictions about investor returns. Powerful investors
achieve higher investment returns, compared to the competitive benchmark. The interesting
exception concerns follow-on investments of moderately powerful insiders who invest below
pro-rata. The theory also provides a warning against the use of unrealized interim returns.
Empirical studies of investor returns sometimes makes use of unrealized interim valuations to
estimate investor portfolio returns (see Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2014)). However, our
model shows that this can be misleading. For example, the presence of a powerful outsider re-
duces unrealized interim returns, yet going forward investor returns are higher in this case. More
generally, the theory suggests that if unrealized interim returns are used to estimate expected
realized returns, they would need to be adjusted to take market power into consideration.
Let us briefly consider how these empirical predictions might be tested, and what challenges
occur. The theory generates predictions about two main dependent variables: company valua-
tions (V1 and V2) and investor returns (R13, R23, and R12).13 In public markets this information
is readily available, but in private markets this data is more difficult to obtain. Even if valuations
can be found, it is often difficult to find data on realized returns. The most important dependent
variables from the theory are market power (m) and prior equity stakes (α). Measuring prior
equity stakes is straightforward in principle, provided the data is disclosed. Measuring market
13The model also makes predictions about the share of investments provided by powerful inside investors in
later rounds (KP2 /K2). The data required for this is a breakdown of round investments by individual investors.
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power, however, is considerably more challenging. Our theory suggests looking at investor fund
sizes. One complicating factor is that different investors specialize in different deals, and face
different competitors at different stages. For example, a venture capital fund might be a large
powerful investor in an early stage deal, when all others are smaller angel investors. However,
that same venture capital fund might be a small player in later stage deals where there are much
larger investors, such as private equity funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, or institutional in-
vestors. Alternative measures of market power might relate to an investor’s reputation and track
record. Hsu (2004), for example, establishes that venture capitalists with higher reputations
offer lower valuations. In addition to these data measurement problem, there is the empirical
challenge of finding exogenous variation in the independent variables. This requires finding ex-
ogenous shocks to investor power and market structures. The work of Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf
(2013) contains some useful ideas for that.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model of staged equity financing with investor market power. Stan-
dard economic reasoning suggests that a powerful investor obtains lower valuations, and thereby
achieves higher returns. We show that while this result holds the first time a powerful investor
invests, it may not hold in subsequent financing rounds. As an insider, a powerful investor faces
dual motives. One is that higher valuations preserve his existing stake, the other is that lower
valuations are more attractive for his new investments. We show that the former motive dom-
inates when the investor is moderately powerful and invests below pro-rata in later financing
rounds. In this case the effect of market power is reversed, i.e., the investor uses his market
power to increase, not decrease valuations. We explain how this is an equilibrium behavior, and
describe the circumstances under which this result obtains.
Our model also asks whether the company prefers to have the powerful investor up-front, or
delay him to a later round. Even though the powerful investor can extract a lower valuation in
the first round, the company prefers to bring him in up-front. This is because once he becomes
an insider, the company can leverage his power to defend its valuation. Hence the title of the
paper: “May the force by with you.”
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Appendix
PI Case: Equilibrium Investment and Valuation.
Using kj2(β) =
1
γ
[
1
K2
βx− µ2
]
we can write the market clearing condition (5) as
KP2 + (n−m)
1
γ
[
1
K2
βx− µ2
]
= K2.
Solving for β we get
β(KP2 ) =
K2
x
[
γ
n−m
(
K2 −KP2
)
+ µ2
]
. (11)
Using the expression for β(KP2 ) we can write the objective function of P as follows:
max
KP2
pi
P |PI
2 (K
P
2 ) = α
Px− αPK2
[
γ
n−m
(
K2 −KP2
)
+ µ2
]
+KP2
[
γ
n−m
(
K2 −KP2
)
+ µ2
]
−
[
µ2K
P
2 +
γ
2m
(
KP2
)2]
.
The optimal investment, KP |PI2 , is then defined by the first-order condition:
αPK2
γ
n−m +
γ
n−m
(
K2 −KP2
)
+ µ2 = K
P
2
γ
n−m + µ2 +
γ
m
KP2 .
Solving for KP2 we get K
P |PI
2 =
m
n+m
[
1 + αP
]
K2. Substituting K
P |PI
2 in (11) then yields the
equilibrium equity share for all investors:
βPI =
K2
x
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K2
]
. (12)
Thus, the equilibrium valuation, V PI2 , is given by
V PI2 =
K2
βPI
=
x(n2 −m2)
γ (n− αPm)K2 + µ2(n2 −m2) .
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Proof of Lemma 1.
Note that P invests above (below) pro-rata when
(1− βP−P )αP + K
P |P−P
2
K2
βP−P > (<)αP .
Using KP |PI2 =
m
n+m
[
1 + αP
]
K2, we can write this condition as
m
n+m
[
1 + αP
]
βP−P > (<)αPβP−P ,
which can be simplified to m
n
> (<)αP . 2
Proof of Proposition 1.
We can immediately see that dKP |PI2 /dα
P > 0 and dV PI2 /dα
P > 0. Moreover,
dK
P |PI
2
dm
=
n
[n+m]2
[
1 + αP
]
K2 > 0,
dV PI2
dm
=
−2mx [γ (n− αPm)K2 + µ2(n2 −m2)]+ x(n2 −m2) [γαPK2 + 2mµ2]
[γ (n− αPm)K2 + µ2(n2 −m2)]2
.
We have dV PI2 /dm > 0 when
(n2 −m2) [γαPK2 + 2mµ2] > 2m [γ (n− αPm)K2 + µ2(n2 −m2)]
⇔ γαPn2K2 + 2µ2mn2 − γαPm2K2 > 2γmnK2 − 2γαPm2K2 + 2µ2mn2
⇔ αP (n2 +m2)− 2mn︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Z
> 0
Note that this condition is satisfied for m = 0. Thus, dV PI2 /dm > 0 for m → 0. Moreover,
for m = n this condition simplifies to αP − 1 > 0, which is clearly violated. Therefore,
dV PI2 /dm < 0 for m → n. Next, note that dZ/dm = 2αPm − 2n < 0. Consequently, there
exists a unique m′ > 0 so that dV PI2 /dm > 0 for m < m
′, and dV PI2 /dm ≤ 0 for m ≥ m′.
Finally, evaluating Z at m = m̂ = αPn we get αPn2
(
αP2 − 1) < 0. Thus, dV PI2
dm
∣∣∣
m=m̂
< 0,
which implies that m′ < m̂. 2
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Proof of Proposition 2.
Setting αP = 0 in (7) and (8) we get
K
P |PO
2 =
m
n+m
K2 (13)
V PO2 =
x(n2 −m2)
γnK2 + µ2(n2 −m2) . (14)
Thus,
dK
P |PO
2
dm
=
n
[n+m]2
K2 > 0
dV PO2
dm
=
−2mx [γnK2 + µ2(n2 −m2)] + x(n2 −m2)2µ2m
[γnK2 + µ2(n2 −m2)]2
= − 2γmnxK2
[γnK2 + µ2(n2 −m2)]2
< 0.
2
Second Round: Additional Comparative Statics.
Consider firstKP |PI2 . We can immediately see that dK
P |PI
2 /dµ2 = dK
P |PI
2 /dγ = dK
P |PI
2 /dx =
0, dKP |PI2 /dK2 > 0, and dK
P |PI
2 /dn < 0. Likewise, for V
PI
2 we can see that dV
PI
2 /dµ2,
dV PI2 /dK2, dV
PI
2 /dK2 < 0, and dV
PI
2 /dx > 0. Moreover,
dV PI2
dn
=
2xn
[
γ
(
n− αPm)K2 + µ2(n2 −m2)]− x(n2 −m2) [γK2 + 2nµ2]
[γ (n− αPm)K2 + µ2(n2 −m2)]2
=
≡Z(αP )︷ ︸︸ ︷[
n2 − 2αPmn+m2)]xγK2
[γ (n− αPm)K2 + µ2(n2 −m2)]2
.
Note that Z(αP ) is decreasing in αP . Moreover, evaluating Z(αP ) at αP = 1 we get Z(1) =
(n−m)2 > 0. This implies that Z(αP ) > 0 for all αP ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, dV PI2 /dn > 0.
Next considerKP |PO2 (see (13) in Proof of Proposition 2). Note that dK
P |PO
2 /dµ2, dK
P |PO
2 /dγ,
dK
P |PO
2 /dx = 0, dK
P |PO
2 /dK2 > 0, and dK
P |PO
2 /dn < 0. In addition, for V
PO
2 (see (14) in
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Proof of Proposition 2) we can immediately see that dV PO2 /dµ2, dV
PO
2 /dµ2, dV
PO
2 /dK2 < 0,
and dV PO2 /dx > 0. Furthermore,
dV PO2
dn
=
2xn [γnK2 + µ2(n
2 −m2)]− x(n2 −m2) [γK2 + 2µ2n]
[γnK2 + µ2(n2 −m2)]2
=
[n2 +m2)] γxK2
[γnK2 + µ2(n2 −m2)]2
> 0.
Second Round Participation of Powerful Investor.
Note that KP |P−P2 > 0 for all α
P ∈ [0, 1]; see (7). Given the structure of P ’s profit function
(see (6)), this implies that P always chooses to invest in the second round for all αP ∈ [0, 1].
Consequently, his participation constraint is always satisfied in the second round.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We can immediately see that KP |PO2 < K
P |PI
2 for all α
P > 0, and KP |PO2 < K
P |NP
2 for
all m > 0. Moreover, note that V PO2 = V
PI
2 at α
P = 0, and recall from Proposition 1 that
dV PI2 /dα
P > 0. Thus, V PO2 < V
PI
2 for all α
P > 0. Finally, V PO2 < V
NP
2 because
x(n2 −m2)
γnK2 + µ2(n2 −m2) <
x
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
⇔ (n2 −m2)
(
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
)
< γnK2 + µ2(n
2 −m2)
⇔ n2 −m2 < n2.
2
Proof of Proposition 4.
We have KP |PI2 ≥ KP |NP2 when
m
n+m
[
1 + αP
]
K2 ≥ m
n
K2 ⇔ αP ≥ α̂P (m) = m
n
,
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which is equivalent to m ≤ m̂ = αPn. Moreover, note that V PI2 ≥ V NP2 when
x(n2 −m2)
γ (n− αPm)K2 + µ2(n2 −m2) ≥
x
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
⇔ (n2 −m2)γ
n
K2 ≥ γ
(
n− αPm)K2
⇔ αP ≥ α̂P (m) = m
n
,
which, again, is equivalent to m ≤ m̂ = αPn. 2
Participation Constraint of Powerful Investor (First Round).
Using the expressions for KP |PI2 and β
PI (see (7) and (12)) we get
piP |PI(αP ) = (1− βPI)αPx+ K
P |PI
2
K2
βPIx− µ1K1 −
[
µ2K
P |PI
2 +
γ
2m
(
K
P |PI
2
)2]
=
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K2
])
αP +
m
n+m
[
1 + αP
] γ (n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K
2
2
−µ1K1 − γm
2
1
[n+m]2
[
1 + αP
]2
K22 . (15)
Likewise, by setting αP = 0 and µ1K1 = 0, we get
piP |PO =
m
n+m
γn
n2 −m2K
2
2 −
γm
2
1
[n+m]2
K22
We then find that piP |PI(αP ) ≥ piP |PO is equivalent to Z ≥ µ1K1, where
Z =
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K2
])
αP − m
n+m
γαPm
n2 −m2K
2
2 +
m
n+m
αP
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K
2
2
−γm
2
1
[n+m]
2
[
2αP +
[
αP
]2]
K22
=
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K2
])
αP − 1
2
αP
γm
(n+m)
2
αP
(n2 −m2)K
2
2
[
m2 + 2mn+ n2
]
=
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− 12αPm
)
n2 −m2 K2
])
αP .
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Thus, P ’s participation constraint can be written as
αP
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− 1
2
αPm
)
n2 −m2 K2
])
≥ µ1K1. (16)
Proof of Proposition 6.
Let α̂ denote the first round equity share which makes A indifferent between accepting α̂
from P , and αPO from a competitive investor. Formally, α̂ is defined by piA|PI(α̂) = piA|PO.
Using (12) with αP = α̂ we get
piA|PI(α̂) = (1− α̂) (1− βPI(α̂))x = (1− α̂)(1− K2
x
[
µ2 +
γ (n− α̂m)
n2 −m2 K2
])
x.
Moreover, recall from the comparative statics analysis for the PO case (see (22)) that
piA|PO =
(
1− K2
x
[
µ2 +
γn
n2 −m2K2
])
x− µ1K1.
Using these two expressions we then find that piA|PI(α̂) = piA|PO is equivalent to
α̂
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ (n+ (1− α̂)m)
n2 −m2 K2
])
= µ1K1, (17)
which defines α̂.
Next we need to show that α̂ satisfies P ’s participation constraint (16). Using (17) we can
write (16) as
α̂
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− 1
2
α̂m
)
n2 −m2 K2
])
≥ α̂
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ (n+ (1− α̂)m)
n2 −m2 K2
])
⇔ 0 ≤ 1− 1
2
α̂,
which is clearly satisfied for all α̂ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the optimal bid for P , which is strictly
preferred by A, is then given by αP = α̂− , with → 0.
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Finally, using (17), we can implicitly differentiate αP = α̂− , → 0, w.r.t. m:
dαP
dm
=
αPγK22
(
(1−αP )(n2−m2)+2m(n+(1−αP )m)
[n2−m2]2
)
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n+
(
1− αP )m)
n2 −m2 K2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+αP γm
n2−m2K
2
2
> 0.
Consequently,
dV PI1
dm
=
d
dm
[
K1
αP
]
< 0.
Powerful Investor in First Round – Comparative Statics.
Recall that αP = α̂− , with → 0, is defined by
Z ≡ αP
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n+
(
1− αP )m)
n2 −m2 K2
])
− µ1K1 = 0.
Moreover, note that
∂Z
∂αP
= x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n+
(
1− αP )m)
n2 −m2 K2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+αP
γm
n2 −m2K
2
2 > 0. (18)
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Using Z we can then implicitly differentiate αP and get
dαP
dµ1
=
K1
∂Z
∂αP
> 0 ⇒ dV
PI
1
dµ1
=
d
dµ1
[
K1
αP
]
< 0
dαP
dµ2
=
αPK2
∂Z
∂αP
> 0 ⇒ dV
PI
1
dµ2
=
d
dµ2
[
K1
αP
]
< 0
dαP
dγ
=
αP
n+(1−αP )m
n2−m2 K
2
2
∂Z
∂αP
> 0 ⇒ dV
PI
1
dγ
=
d
dγ
[
K1
αP
]
< 0
dαP
dx
= − α
P
∂Z
∂αP
< 0 ⇒ dV
PI
1
dx
=
d
dx
[
K1
αP
]
> 0
dαP
dn
= −
αPK22
γ(n2+m2)+2γ(1−αP )mn
[n2−m2]2
∂Z
∂αP
< 0 ⇒ dV
PI
1
dn
=
d
dn
[
K1
αP
]
> 0.
Likewise,
dαP
dK1
=
µ1
∂Z
∂αP
, (19)
so that
dV PI1
dK1
=
d
dK1
[
K1
αP
]
=
≡T︷ ︸︸ ︷
αP −K1dα
P
dK1
[αP ]2
.
Using (19) with (18), we can write T as
T =
=Z=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
αP
[
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n+
(
1− αP )m)
n2 −m2 K2
]]
− µ1K1 +
(
αP
)2 γm
n2−m2K
2
2
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ(n+(1−αP )m)
n2−m2 K2
]
+ αP γm
n2−m2K
2
2
=
(
αP
)2 γm
n2−m2K
2
2
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n+
(
1− αP )m)
n2 −m2 K2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+αP γm
n2−m2K
2
2
> 0.
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Thus, dV PI1 /dK1 > 0.
Finally note that αP = α̂ − , with  → 0, where α̂ is defined by piA|PI(α̂) = piA|PO. Con-
sequently, we get the same comparative statics results for piA|PI as for piA|PO.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Recall that αP = α̂ − , with  → 0, where α̂ is defined by (10) (see Proposition 6). For
m = 0 we can write condition (10) as
α̂ =
µ1K1(
1− K2
x
[
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
])
x
.
Clearly, α̂ = αNP for m = 0. Thus, αP = αNP − , with  → 0, for m = 0, which implies
that V PO1 → V NP1 for m = 0. Moreover, recall from Proposition 6 that dV PI1 /dm < 0.
Consequently, V PI1 < V
NP
1 for all m > 0.
Next, note that the condition piA|PI(α̂) = piA|PO, which defines α̂, can be written as
(1− α̂) (1− βPI)− (1− αPO) (1− βPO) = 0. (20)
Moreover, recall that βPI and βPO are given by
βPI =
K2
x
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K2
]
βPO =
K2
x
[
µ2 +
γn
n2 −m2K2
]
.
We can immediately see that βPI = βPO for m = 0. This implies that α̂ = αPO for m = 0, and
therefore αP = αPO − , with → 0, for m = 0. Hence, V PI1 → V PO1 for m = 0. Moreover, it
is easy to see that βPI < βPO for all m > 0. And using (20) we get
∂α̂
∂βPI
= − 1− α̂
1− βPI < 0.
This implies that αP = α̂ −  > αPO, with  → 0, for all m > 0. Consequently, V PI1 < V PO1
for all m > 0. 2
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Proof of Proposition 8.
The expected profit for A is given by
piA|i =
(
1− αi) (1− βi)x = (1− βi)x− µ1K1,
with i ∈ {NP,PO, PI}. Using the expressions for βNP (see (2)) and βPO (see (12) with
αP = 0) we get
piA|NP =
(
1− K2
x
[
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
])
x− µ1K1 (21)
piA|PO =
(
1− K2
x
[
µ2 +
γn
n2 −m2K2
])
x− µ1K1. (22)
It is easy to see that piA|NP = piA|PO when m = 0. Moreover, note that dpiA|PO/dm < 0. Thus,
piA|NP > piA|PO for all m > 0.
Likewise, we can immediately see that dpiA|i/dµ1, dpiA|i/dµ2, dpiA|i/dγ, dpiA|i/dK1, dpiA|i/dK2 <
0, and dpiA|i/dx > 0, i ∈ {NP,PO}. Moreover, dpiA|NP/dn > 0, and
dpiA|PO
dn
= −γ [n
2 −m2]− 2γn2
[n2 −m2]2 K
2
2 =
γ [n2 +m2]
[n2 −m2]2 K
2
2 > 0.
Next, recall from Proof of Proposition 7 that αP = αPO − , with  → 0, when m = 0.
For m > 0 we have αP = α̂ − , with  → 0, where α̂ is defined by piA|PI(α̂) = piA|PO. This
implies that piA|PI(αP ) = piA|PO + , with  → 0. Consequently, piA|NP > piA|PI > piA|PO for
all m > 0.
We can immediate see from (21) that dpiA|NP/dm = 0. Moreover, it is easy to see from (22)
that dpiA|PO/dm < 0. And because piA|PI(αP ) = piA|PO + , with → 0, this also implies that
dpiA|PI/dm < 0.
Finally recall that αP = α̂ − , with  → 0, where α̂ is defined by piA|PI(α̂) = piA|PO.
Consequently, we get the same comparative statics results for piA|PI as for piA|PO. 2
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Proof of Proposition 9.
We first derive and compare R23 for the different investor constellations. Using the expres-
sions of V NP2 , V
PO
2 , and V
PI
2 , we get
RNP23 = µ2 +
γ
n
K2 R
PO
23 = µ2 + γ
n
n2 −m2K2 R
PI
23 = µ2 + γ
n− αPm
n2 −m2 K2.
Recall from Propositions 3 and 4 that V PO2 < V
HPI
2 < V
NP
2 < V
MPI
2 . Thus, R
PO
23 > R
HPI
23 >
RNP23 > R
MPI
23 .
Next consider R12. Using the expressions of V PO1 and V
PO
2 we get
RPO12 =
V PO2 −K2
V PO1
=
x
µ2+γ
n
n2 −m2K2
−K2
1
µ1
(
1− K2
x
[
µ2 +
γn
n2−m2K2
])
x
=
µ1
µ2 +
γn
n2 −m2K2
.
Likewise, using the expressions of V NP1 and V
NP
2 we find
RNP12 =
V NP2 −K2
V NP1
=
(1−K2x [µ2+ γnK2])x
µ2+
γ
n
K2
1
µ1
(
1− K2
x
[
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
])
x
=
µ1
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
.
Finally, using V PI1 and V
PI
2 we get
RPI12 =
V PI2 −K2
V PI1
=
x−K2
[
µ2 + γ
n− αPm
n2 −m2 K2
]
µ2 + γ
n− αPm
n2 −m2 K2
αP
K1
,
where αP satisfies
αP
(
x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n+
(
1− αP )m)
n2 −m2 K2
])
= µ1K1. (23)
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Note that we can rewrite RPI12 as
RPI12 =
αP
(
x−K2
[
µ2 + γ
n+
(
1− αP )m
n2 −m2 K2
])
1
K1
+
[
γ
m
n2 −m2K
2
2
]
αP
K1
µ2 + γ
n− αPm
n2 −m2 K2
.
Using (23) we then get
RPI12 =
µ1 + γ
m
n2 −m2K
2
2
αP
K1
µ2 + γ
n− αPm
n2 −m2 K2
.
We know from Propositions 3 and 4 that V PO2 < V
HPI
2 < V
NP
2 < V
MPI
2 . And according to
Proposition 7, V PI1 < V
PO
1 < V
NP
1 . Moreover, we know from Proposition 6 that dV
PI
1 /dm <
0. Consequently, V HPI1 < V
MPI
1 < V
PO
1 < V
NP
1 . This implies that (i) R
HPI
12 > R
PO
12
because V PO2 < V
HPI
2 and V
HPI
1 < V
PO
1 , (ii) R
PO
12 < R
MPI
12 because V
PO
2 < V
MPI
2 and
V MPI1 < V
PO
1 , and (iii) R
NP
12 < R
MPI
12 because V
NP
2 < V
MPI
2 and V
MPI
1 < V
PO
1 < V
NP
1 .
Moreover, it is straightforward to show thatRPO12 < R
NP
12 . Consequently,R
PO
12 < R
NP
12 < R
MPI
12
and RPO12 < R
HPI
12 .
Finally, using the above expressions for R12 and R23 we get
RPO13 = R
PO
12 R
PO
23 =
µ1
µ2 +
γn
n2 −m2K2
[
µ2 + γ
n
n2 −m2K2
]
= µ1
RNP13 = R
NP
12 R
NP
23 =
µ1
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
[
µ2 +
γ
n
K2
]
= µ1.
Likewise,
RPI13 = R
PI
12 R
PI
23 =
µ1 + γ
m
n2 −m2K
2
2
αP
K1
µ2 + γ
n− αPm
n2 −m2 K2
[
µ2 + γ
n− αPm
n2 −m2 K2
]
= µ1 + γ
m
n2 −m2K
2
2
αP
K1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Z
.
We can immediately see that RPO13 = R
NP
13 = µ1. And because Z > 0, we have R
PI
13 > R
PO
13 =
RNP13 = µ1. Moreover, recall from Proof of Proposition 6 that dα
P/dm > 0 – this implies that
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dZ/dm > 0. Consequently, RHPI13 > R
MPI
13 . All this implies that R
HPI
13 > R
MPI
13 > R
PO
13 =
RNP13 = µ1. 2
The Role of Debt – Derivations.
Consider the second financing round. Given r2 each competitive investor will invest k
j
2,
j = m+1, ..., n, so that the price per unit of capital equals the marginal cost: 1+r2 = µ2+γk
j
2.
Consequently, kj|D2 (r2) = [1 + r2 − µ2] /γ. Using kj|D2 (r2) in the market clearing condition,
KP2 + (n−m) kj|D2 (r2) = K2, and solving for 1 + r2, we get
1 + r2 =
γ
n−m
[
K2 −KP2
]
+ µ2. (24)
P then chooses KP2 to maximize his expected net return
pi
P |D
2 (K
P
2 ) = α
P (x− (1 + r2)K2) + (1 + r2)KP2 −
[
µ2K
P
2 +
γ
2m
(
KP2
)2]
. (25)
Using (24) we can write (25) as
pi
P |D
2 (K
P
2 ) = α
Px+
(
γ
n−m
[
K2 −KP2
]
+ µ2
)[
KP2 − αPK2
]− [µ2KP2 + γ2m (KP2 )2] .
The optimal investment, KP |D2 , is then defined by the first-order condition:
− γ
n−m
[
KP2 − αPK2
]
+
γ
n−m
[
K2 −KP2
]
+ µ2 = µ2 +
γ
m
KP2 .
Solving for KP2 we get
K
P |D
2 =
m
n+m
[
1 + αP
]
K2. (26)
Next, using (26) we can rewrite (24) as
1 + r∗2 =
γ
n−m
[
K2 − m
n+m
[
1 + αP
]
K2
]
+ µ2 = µ2 +
[
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2
]
K2. (27)
Thus, the cost of debt financing in the second round is given by
(1 + r∗2)K2 = K2
[
µ2 +
[
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2
]
K2
]
.
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Moreover, note that the cost of equity financing is given by
βPIx = K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K2
]
.
Consequently, (1 + r∗2)K2 = β
PIx.
Next we derive the outcome for the first financing round. Consider first the PO case (where
αP = 0), and let
T2 ≡ (1 + r∗2)K2 = βPOx = K2
[
µ2 +
γn
n2 −m2K2
]
denote the cost of financing in the second round (which is the same for debt and equity fi-
nancing). Under debt financing the competitive investor’s zero profit condition is given by
(1 + r1)K1 − µ1K1 = 0. Consequently, the equilibrium return is rC1 = µ1 − 1. The expected
profit for A, denoted by piA|D(PO), is then given by
piA|D(PO) = x− (1 + rC1 )K1 − T2 = (1− K2x
[
µ2 +
γn
n2 −m2K2
])
x− µ1K1.
We can immediately see that piA|D(PO) = piA|PO (see (22), i.e., for the PO case debt and equity
financing are equivalent for A.
Now consider the PI case. The expected profit for A is then given by
piA|D(PI) = x− (1 + r1)K1 − T2 = x− (1 + r1)K1 −K2
[
µ2 +
γn
n2 −m2K2
]
.
Let r̂2 denote the return which makes A indifferent between accepting r̂2 from P , and rC1 from
a competitive investor. Formally, r̂2 is defined by piA|D(PI)(r̂2) = piA|D(PO), which immediately
implies that r̂2 = rC1 = µ1 − 1. Consequently, P offers rP1 = r̂2 +  = µ1 − 1 + , with → 0.
The expected profit for A is then given by piA|D(PI) = piA|D(PO) + , with  → 0. And because
piA|D(PO) = piA|PO, we find again that debt and equity financing lead to the same expected profit
for A.
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It remains to show that P is strictly better off under equity financing. For this it is sufficient
to compare the joint surplus of A and P under equity and debt financing, since piA|D(PO) =
piA|PO. Note that P ’s expected profit under debt financing can be written as
piP |D(PI) =
(
1 + rP1
)
K1 + (1 + r
∗
2)K
P
2 − µ1K1 −
[
µ2K
P
2 +
γ
2m
(
KP2
)2]
.
Using rP1 = µ1 − 1, (26) with αP = 0, and (27), we can write piP |D(PI) as
piP |D(PI) = KP2
[
(1 + r∗2)−
[
µ2 +
γ
2m
KP2
]]
=
1
2
γm
n2 −m2K
2
2 .
Thus, the joint surplus for A and P under debt financing, ΠD ≡ piA|D(PI) + piP |D(PI), is given
by
ΠD = x−K2
[
µ2 +
γn
n2 −m2K2
]
− µ1K1 + 1
2
γm
n2 −m2K
2
2
= x− µ1K1 − µ2K2 −
γ
(
n− 1
2
m
)
n2 −m2 K
2
2 .
Next we derive the joint surplus for equity financing (with αP > 0). We first note that A’s
expected profit is given by
piA|PI =
(
1− αPI) (1− βPI)x = (1− αPI)(1− K2
x
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K2
])
x.
Moreover, the expected profit for P is given by (15). Thus, the joint surplus under equity
financing, ΠE ≡ piA|PI + piP |PI , can be written as
ΠE = x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K2
]
− µ1K1 +
γ
(
1 + αP
)
m
(n+m)2
K22
[(
n− αPm)
(n−m) −
1
2
[
1 + αP
]]
= x−K2
[
µ2 +
γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K2
]
− µ1K1 + 1
2
γ
(
1− (αP )2)m
n2 −m2 K
2
2 .
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Finally, we have ΠE > ΠD if
−γ
(
n− αPm)
n2 −m2 K
2
2 +
1
2
γ
(
1− (αP )2)m
n2 −m2 K
2
2 > −
γ
(
n− 1
2
m
)
n2 −m2 K
2
2
⇔ αPm+ 1
2
(
1− (αP )2)m > 1
2
m
⇔ 2 > αP ,
which is clearly satisfied. Thus, ΠE > ΠD. And because piA|D(PO) = piA|PO, we can infer that
piP |D(PO) < piP |PO.
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